

## Message Text

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ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SY-04 A-01 OPR-01 SCCT-01 CIAE-00

DODE-00 PM-03 H-01 INR-05 L-02 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01

RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 SSO-00 NSCE-00

USSS-00 FBO-02 /062 W

----- 079566

R 121656Z NOV 74

FM AMEMBASSY NASSAU

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6163

INFO AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 NASSAU 1888

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: ASEC ABLD AFSP BF

SUBJ: SECURITY: NASSAU SECURITY SITUATION

REF: NASSAU 1822

SANTO DOMINGO FOR RSO

FOR ARA, ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROGERS AND EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR  
ACKERMAN, AND SY FROM AMBASSADOR WEISS

1. THE LATE OCTOBER REPORT OF A PLOT TO KIDNAP ME REMAINS  
SHROUDED IN SOME DEGREE OF AMBIGUITY. WHILE BAHAMIAN GOVERN-  
MENT ACTED PROMPTLY AND VIGOROUSLY TO INTENSIFY PROTECTION  
PROVIDED ME AND TO INVESTIGATE REPORT, HARD EVIDENCE OF WHO,  
WHEN, AND WHY OF THE ALLEGED PLOT REMAINS LACKING OR AMBIGU-  
OUS, AND FULLY SATISFACTORY ANSWERS MAY NEVER BE KNOWN.

2. IN A RECENT LUNCHEON CONVERSATION WITH COMMISSIONER OF  
POLICE THOMPSON, IT WAS APPARENT TO ME THAT HE FEELS INFORMA-  
TION FROM HIS INFORMANT SUBSTANTIATES BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT  
THAT KIDNAPPING WAS BEING PLANNED. A SEPARATE MEETING WITH  
THE HEAD OF THE SPECIAL BRANCH SUGGESTED SOMEWHAT GREATER  
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QUESTION REGARDING RELIABILITY OF INFORMANT. IN ANY EVENT,

IF THE REPORTED ATTEMPT WAS REAL, THE EFFORT WAS IN ITS EARLY STAGES AND BORE THE EARMARKS OF UNSOPHISTICATED CONSPIRATORS. POLICE SURVEILLANCE OF WHAT RADICAL OR DISSIDENT GROUPS EXIST HERE SHOWS NO CONNECTION BETWEEN THEM AND NATIONALS OF OTHER COUNTRIES ALTHOUGH ONE OF THE DISSIDENT POLITICAL FIGURES QUESTIONED ABOUT THE KIDNAPPING WAS REPORTED TO HAVE HAD AN EARLIER INTEREST IN CONTACTS WITH CUBA.

3. COMMISSIONER THOMPSON, FOREIGN MINISTER ADDERLEY, AND OTHER GCOB OFFICIALS WHO HAVE SPOKEN WITH ME TEND TO EMPHASIZE EMBARRASSMENT OVER THE INCIDENT RATHER THAN A BELIEF IN A DANGER, PRESENT OR CONTINUING, TO ME. THIS FACT NOTWITHSTANDING, SUBSTANTIALLY INTENSIFIED SECURITY MEASURES TAKEN BY GCOB REMAIN IN PLACE.

4. IN TERMS OF POTENTIAL, BAHAMAS IS WIDE OPEN TO INFILTRATION FROM OUTSIDE TERRORIST OR TROUBLEMAKERS WITH A MILLION AND A HALF TOURISTS ENTERING THE COUNTRY ANNUALLY, A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF THOSE FROM THE US WITHOUT REQUIREMENT FOR PASSPORT AND THE SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL IT PROVIDES. NEVERTHELESS, THOSE MOST FAMILIAR WITH THE LOCAL SCENE DO NOT CONSIDER NASSAU A TERRORIST THREAT AREA. THIS REMAINS THE CONCLUSION OF THE EMBASSY SECURITY WATCH COMMITTEE, AND I AM INCLINED TO AGREE WITH THAT JUDGMENT.

5. APART FROM THE JUDGMENT OF NASSAU WITH RESPECT TO TERRORISM, HOWEVER, IT IS UNDENIABLY TRUE THAT CRIME IS ON THE INCREASE IN THE TWO PRINCIPAL ISLANDS OF THE BAHAMAS, I.E. NEW PROVIDENCE AND GRAND BAHAMA. US EMBASSY STAFF IN NASSAU HAVE BEEN AMONG THE VICTIMS OF INCIDENTS OF CRIME, THE MOST RECENT BEING AN ESPECIALLY DANGEROUS ROBBERY OF TWO EMBASSY FAMILIES THREATENED AT RIFLE AND SHOTGUN POINT. DISCUSSIONS WITH LEADING CITIZENS OF FREEPORT DURING MY RECENTLY CONCLUDED VISIT THERE SUGGEST THIS SUBJECT IS HIGH ON THEIR AGENDA OF CONCERNS.

6. I DRAW THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS FROM FOREGOING. WHILE PERSONAL SECURITY THREAT IS NOT NOW SEVERE NOR POLITICALLY ORIENTED THREATS SUBSTANTIAL, NEITHER CAN THEY AN LONGER BE DESCRIBED AS NON-EXISTENT IN NASSAU AND, CLEARLY, WE WOULD

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BE LESS THAN WISE WERE WE TO ENTIRELY DISCOUNT POTENTIAL FOR A FUTURE INCIDENT. ACCORDINGLY, WHILE THERE IS NO NEED TO OVER-REACT TO RECENT ALLEGED KIDNAP PLOT, IT DOES UNDERLINE OUR PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED VIEW THAT THIS POST, STILL RELATIVELY TRANQUIL, NEEDS TO HAVE IN PLACE THE MINIMUM NUMBER OF PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES WHICH PRUDENCE HAS CALLED FOR ELSEWHERE. SOME OF THESE MEASURES HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED IN CONSULTATIONS WITH BUREAU AND SY EXPERTS AND HAVE BEEN UNDER

REVIEW FOR SOME TIME BY THE DEPARTMENT. OTHERS WE ARE SUGGEST-  
ING FOR THE FIRST TIME. TO COMPLETE THE PICTURE, I INCLUDE  
IN THE LIST THAT FOLLOWS THOSE STEPS WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKEN  
ALREADY.

7. THE POST SECURITY WATCH COMMITTEE IS IN AGREEMENT THAT THE  
FOLLOWING ACTIONS INTENDED TO INCREASE THE SECURITY OF THE  
CHANCERY REMAIN VALID AND SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED AS SOON AS  
POSSIBLE:

A. GROUND FLOOR OF EMBASSY: BARS FOR ALL GROUND FLOOR WIN-  
DOWS IN CHANCERY (RSO/SY ACTION) TO PROVIDE PROTECTION FROM  
THREAT OUTSIDE OF CHANCERY TO PERSONNEL OF CONSULAR AND ECON/  
COMMERCIAL SECTIONS.

B. BECAUSE PUBLIC TRAFFIC IN EMBASSY GROUND FLOOR AREA IS  
VERY HEAVY, INSTALLATION OF CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION MONITOR  
FOR FRONT AND REAR ENTRANCE OF CHANCERY AND VISA WAITING ROOM  
(RSO/SY ACTION), TO BE USED BY MARINE SECURITY GUARD ON  
EMBASSY SECOND FLOOR.

C. INSTALLATION OF INTER-COM SYSTEM TO ASSIST MARINE SECUR-  
ITY GUARD (PROCUREMENT INITIATED BY POST).

D. BULLET PROOF GLASS DOOR FOR ENTRANCE TO EMBASSY SECOND  
FLOOR AREA (RSO/SY ACTION) IN ORDER TO PROVIDE APPROPRIATE  
COMBINATION OF VISIBILITY AND SECURITY NEEDED BY MSG LOCATED  
10 FEET FROM ELEVATOR AND STAIRS.

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ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SY-04 A-01 OPR-01 SCCT-01 CIAE-00

DODE-00 PM-03 H-01 INR-05 L-02 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01

RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 SSO-00 NSCE-00

USSH-00 FBO-02 /062 W

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R 121656Z NOV 74

FM AMEMBASSY NASSAU

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6164

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 NASSAU 1888

8. IN ADDITION, THE EMBASSY SECURITY WATCH COMMITTEE BELIEVES THAT MINIMUM NECESSARY SECURITY MEASURES FOR THE PRESENT EMBASSY RESIDENCE ARE:

- A. PATIO-TYPE FLOODLIGHTS FOR REAR OF ER (INSTALLED NOV 6, 1974).
- B. EXPLORATION OF POSSIBILITY OF OBTAINING POLICE DOG AND HANDLER FOR ER ON 24-HOUR BASIS. IF NOT SUPPLIED BY THE POLICE, A CONTRACT WITH A LOCAL SECURITY FIRM SHOULD BE ENTERED INTO. (BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER HAS HAD SUCH PROTECTION FOR PAST YEAR AND A HALF).
- C. INSTALLATION OF CHAIN-LINK FENCE AROUND GROUND-LEVEL ROOF AT REAR OF ER (ESTIMATED COST \$620).
- D. INSTALLATION OF BARS ON ALL EASILY ACCESSIBLE WINDOWS AT ER (ESTIMATED COST \$3,200).
- E. SUPPLYING AMBASSADOR WITH WALKIE-TALKIE TO POLICE GUARD (OC SUPPLY ACTION INITIATED).

9. THE STEPS RECOMMENDED FOR THE ER ARE, OF COURSE, INTERIM IN NATURE AS THE PURCHASE OF A NEW RESIDENCE HAS BEEN UNDER DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE EMBASSY AND THE DEPARTMENT FOR WELL OVER A YEAR AND I WAS GIVEN TO UNDERSTAND PRIOR TO MY DEPARTURE THAT SUCH A PROPOSAL HAD BEEN AGREED TO IN PRINCIPLE. AT THE DEPARTMENT'S REQUEST, I REVIEWED THE RESIDENCE SITUATION.  
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ACTION AFTER I ARRIVED AND FORWARDED MY RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO WHICH OF THE RESIDENCES APPROVED BY THE FBO SHOULD IN FACT BE CHOSEN FOR PURCHASE. MY LETTER TO ARA DATED OCT 2, 1974 HAS HAD NO RESPONSE. HOWEVER UNDRAMATIC THE EVENTS OF LATE OCTOBER MAY IN TIME TURN OUT TO BE, IT DOES ILLUSTRATE YET ANOTHER LIABILITY OF THE PRESENT RESIDENCE AND THE NEED FOR A DECISION ON MOVING. THE PRESENT ER IS REMOTELY LOCATED. POLICE COMMISSIONER THOMPSON EXPLICITLY RAISED WITH ME THE PROBLEM IT POSES TO HIS PROVIDING ADEQUATE SECURITY. ITS ISOLATION INCREASES ITS VULNERABILITY. TIMELY REINFORCEMENT IN CASE OF TROUBLE IS VERY DIFFICULT. SITUATED IN A RELATIVELY UNDEVELOPED PORTION OF THE ISLAND, IT HAS AN INADEQUATE ROAD NETWORK WHICH SEVERELY LIMITS EXTENT TO WHICH IT IS POSSIBLE TO VARY MY ROUTE TO AND FROM THE OFFICE, A QUITE STANDARD SECURITY OPTION WHICH SHOULD BE AVAILABLE TO US. FINALLY, WE ARE PLACING A VERY GREAT STRAIN ON THE MANPOWER RESOURCES OF THE ROYAL BAHAMIAN POLICE FORCE IN THE BEST OF CIRCUMSTANCES AND EXAGGERATING THAT STRAIN BY THE RESIDENCE LOCATION.

10. THE EMBASSY SECURITY WATCH COMMITTEE, OVER WHOSE MEETINGS I HAVE PRESIDED SINCE MY ARRIVAL, HAS DEVOTED A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF TIME TO THE QUESTION OF PROVIDING PROTECTION FOR

ALL PERSONNEL OF THE US OFFICIAL COMMUNITY. PERCEPTIONS OF THE THREAT TO THAT COMMUNITY MAY BE OF GREATER OR LESSER INTENSITY, BUT ALL ARE AGREED THAT THE SCATTERING OF RESIDENCES THROUGHOUT THE ISLAND, SOME IN QUITE ISOLATED AREAS, DOES INCREASE VULNERABILITY. PERSONNEL ARE SUBJECT TO THE SAME POTENTIAL FOR CRIMINAL ACTIVITY AS EXISTS FOR OTHER CITIZENS IN THIS COMMUNITY ALTHOUGH AS RELATIVELY MORE AFFLUENT ARE OBVIOUSLY PRIME TARGETS. WE HAVE CONSIDERED A RANGE OF OPTIONS TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION, INCLUDING ALL-GOVERNMENT-LEASES AND/OR COMPOUND LIVING, BUT HAVE DISCARDED THE LATTER AS A SOLUTION. THE PURPOSES OF THE FORMER, I.E. ALL-GOVERNMENT-LEASES, OBVIOUSLY WOULD BE TO ESTABLISH A USG RESPONSIBILITY TO UNDERTAKE STEPS TO PROTECT PROPERTY, MANY OF THEM BEYOND THE FINANCIAL REACH OF THE STAFF. RECOGNIZING THE LIMITATION IMPOSED BY EXISTING POLICY ON GOVERNMENT LEASES AND ESCHEWING COMPOUND LIVING AS HIGHLY UNDESIRABLE FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS, NOT ALL OF THEM SECURITY ORIENTED, BEST SOLUTION WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO COME UP WITH IS A PATROL BY A CONFIDENTIAL

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GUARD WITH A TRAINED DOG WHICH WOULD COVER ALL RESIDENCES SEVERAL TIMES EVERY 24 HOURS. IF THE BAHAMIAN GOVERNMENT DOES NOT HAVE THE CAPACITY TO PROVIDE THIS CAPABILITY, AND WE HAVE INITIATED DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM ON THE SUBJECT, WE SHOULD BE AUTHORIZED TO CONTRACT WITH A PRIVATE FIRM FOR THIS SERVICE. LIGHTING OUTSIDE OF RESIDENCES WOULD ALSO BE HIGHLY DESIRABLE AND IS IN FACT AMONG THE RECOMMENDATIONS THE RSO HAS PUT TO US ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, BUT, TO BE PRACTICAL, COSTS OF INSTALLATION AND ADDITIONS TO ELECTRICAL BILLS WOULD HAVE TO BE PAID BY DEPARTMENT. THIS STEP MIGHT MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR US TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE SECURITY FOR OUR PERSONNEL WITHOUT GOING TO GOVERNMENT LEASE.

11. IN DUE COURSE, AS WAS SUGGESTED TO ME AS DESIRABLE IN MY SY BRIEFINGS PRIOR TO DEPARTURE, I WOULD EXPECT THE EMBASSY LIMOUSINE TO BE RETURNED TO THE US FOR INSTALLATION OF BULLET PROOF WINDOWS AND/OR BODY ARMORING AND WE HAVE INITIATED A REQUEST TO A/OPR FOR THIS.

12. I BRING THIS ANALYSIS AND ITS ATTENDANT RECOMMENDATIONS (SOME NEW, SOME OLD) TO YOUR ATTENTION AS I KNOW FROM MY BRIEFING IN THE DEPARTMENT BEFORE MY DEPARTURE OF THE CONCERN WE ALL HAVE IN THIS AREA AND OUR OWN SHARED COMMITMENT TO DOING EVERYTHING THAT IS POSSIBLE AND PRACTICAL TO PROVIDE FOR THE PROTECTION OF US PERSONNEL ABROAD. I WOULD HOPE THAT WITH COORDINATION AMONG THE BUREAU, FBO AND SY, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE IN VERY SHORT ORDER TO HAVE FINAL AND FAVORABLE ACTION ON THESE PROPOSALS, ALL BUT ONE OF THEM MODEST IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, AND THE QUESTION OF THE ER ALREADY RESOLVED FAVORABLY IN PRINCIPLE IN ANOTHER SETTING AND NEEDING ONLY

DECISIONS WITH RESPECT TO ITS IMPLEMENTATION.

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## Message Attributes

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**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
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**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
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